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RECENT DECISIONS
Wills - Revocation of the Will of a Childless Man - The testator
executed a will making provisions for two of his brothers and two
sisters at a time when he was a widower without issue. He wa§ married about one and one-half years later. He died several years later
without issue, survived by three brothers, a sister and his widow.
The widow contested the admission of the will to probate. Held,
marriage without subsequent issue is not sufficient to operate as a
revocation of a will of a testator executed prior to that marriage
and at a time when he was without issue. In re Wehr's Will, Wehr et
al. v. Wehr, 247 Wis. 98, 18 N.W. (2d) 709.
One contention of the widow, of interest here, was that in Wisconsin the will of an unmarried man having no issue is revoked
by his marriage,' particularly in view of the rule which makes the
widow the sole heir of her husband in the event of his death without
issue. She sought to prove that in no cases where the question was
directly involved, did a court ever hold that the will of an unmarried
man having no issue was not revoked by marriage. No English
case wds found to support this contention. Further, the court found
the subject mentioned in dicta of two early American cases2 and
said that a rule contrary to the widow's contention was established
by implication, stated in dicta, and understood to exist by the bench,
bar and legal writers.
Another contention of the widow was that "assuming there was
a common law rule that marriage alone would not revoke a will in
the circumstances involved here, the rule had its foundation in the
fact that the wife, so far at least as the real property of the husband
was concerned, had no heritable interest' until the birth of a child;
that the rule that marriage plus birth of a child revoked the will had
2 Wis. Stat. (1943) Sec. 238.14. "Wills, how revoked. No will nor any part thereof shall be revoked unless by burning, tearing, * * * excepting only that nothing
contained in this section shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator."
2Shepherd v. Shepherd, 5 T. R. 51 (1770). "Upon the whole, therefore, I am of
opinion, 1st, that a will is revoked by subsequent marriage and issue. 2dly, that
marriage alone, or birth of children alone, is not sufficient to operate a revocation." Brush v. Wilkins, N. Y., 4 Johns. Ch. 506. Chancellor Kent, after a review of the English cases, reached the conclusion that the following was the
settled rule of the English common law as early as 1775. "* * * that marriage
and a child taken together, (though neither of them taken separately was sufficient) did amount to an implied revocation, ** *" This statement is repeated
in 4 Kent, Commentaries (14th ed.) 521, 522.
3 Was dower a heritable interest, or, was inheritance subordinate to dower?
Blackstone, Commentaries, Lewis Ed., 1900, II: 129, "Tenant in dower is where
the husband of a woman is seised of an estate of inheritance, and dies: in this
case, the wife shall have the third part of all the lands and tenements whereof
he was seised at any time during the coverture, to hold to herself for the term
of her natural life."
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its foundation in a change of circumstances creating new heritable
rights, as well as new moral and legal obligations, this being considered
enough (1) to warrant the assumption that the testator, had he adverted to the matter, would have changed his will, and (2) to call
for a rule of law based on the equities of the situation treating
the new circumstances as effecting a revocation." To support this
point the widow cited the Battis case,4 wherein the court found that
a divorce was such a change in the condition and circumstances of
the testator as to revoke his will or part thereof by implication.
From this the widow argued that implied revocation can never be
governed by a fixed rule of common law unchangeable except by
legislative enactment. And she concluded that when in Wisconsin,
husband and wife, in the absence of issue, were made heirs of each
other, that was such a fundamental change in property rights, such
a radical increase in the rights of the wife, such an enlargement of
the legal and moral obligations of the husband, as to bring into operation an implication of revocation.
After examination of several cases presenting a conflict of authority in sister states on the rule in controversy,5 and finding that the
great weight of authority had been against the widow's position,
the court reached the conclusion that "the rule of the common law
is not so fixed as to be within the constitutional protection of Article
XIV, sec. 13, Wisconsin Constitution.;6 that being a rule of implication, it is necessarily one which changes of circumstances can change
specific application of it. It should be pointed out, however, at this
stage, that whatever application of the rule to specific situations has
been made must be held to be an important rule of property and one
that should not be disturbed unless clearly wrong."1
4 Will

of Battis, 143 Wis. 234 at 239, 126 N. W. 9, 11, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1101

(1910). "The change in the condition and circumstances of a testator incident
to a divorce and distribution of the husband's estate operates to produce a complete destruction of their legal and moral relations and consequent obligations
and duties."
5Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384, 61 Am. St. Rep.
419 (1896) ; Hoy v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732, 48 So. 903, 25 L. R. A., N. S., 182, 136
Am. St. Rep. 548, 17 Ann. Cas. 1137 (1908) ; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 3 A,
604, 56 Am. Rep. 530 (1886); Goodsell's Appeal from Probate, 55 Conn. 171,
10 A. 557 (1887) ; Bowers v. Bowers, 53 Ind. 430 (1876) ; In re Adler's Estate,
52 Wash. 539, 100 P. 1019 (1909) ; Vanek v. Vanek, 104 Kan. 624, 180 P. 240
(1919) ; Herzog v. Trust Co. of Easton, 67 Fla. 54, 64 So. 426, Ann Cas. 1917A.
201 (1914); Fleming v. Blount, 202 Ark. 507, 151 S.W. (2d) 88 '(1941);
Scherrer v. Brown, 21 Colo. 481, 42 P. 668 (1895); Tyler v. Tyler, 19 Ill.
151
(1857) ; Toepfer v. Kaeufer 12 N. M. 372, 78 P. 53, 67 L. R. A. 315 (1904).
6Wis. Const. Art. XIV, Sec. 13, "Common law continued in force. Such parts of
the common law as are now in force in the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of this state
until altered or suspended by the legislaure."
7 Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Beloit, 215 Wis. 439, 254 N. W. 119 (1934),
"Under the principle of stare deciss, a rule of law in the nature of a rule of
property once established and acquiesced in without change by the legislature
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What happens when a testator does not bother to draft a new
will after his marriage? He could have done so. He could have
cut his widow down to her statutory rights or he could have given
her all of his property. In such a situation it is a great deal more
important to have a certain and understandable rule than to have
one that appears at the moment to be logically more sound. The court
considered the Wisconsin cases bearing on the point 8 and stated that
it recognized the general principle asserted by the widow in the
present case, but would refuse to make the specific application of
it here demanded. Thus the court has followed the majority rule
in this country; a rule based in part on the fact that sufficient protection to the wife has been given by statutes securing a portion of
the spouse's estate to her regardless of his will, and in part upon the
opinion that the real basis of the common law rule was that the
wife did have dower rights and certain rights in personalty, even
under the common law rules of property, and the modem changes
are not so fundamental as was asserted by the widow.
JosEPH A. BETHEL

should be adhered to." State ex rel. Gisholt Mach. Co. v. Norsman, 168 Wis.
442 at 445, 169 N. W. 429 (1919). "This doctrine is so firmly written into the
decisions of this court as to have become a rule of property in this state, which
it is our duty to respect and protect." Will of Butter, 239 Wis. 249, at 255, 1
N. W. (2d) 87 (1941). "If a change is to be made in this rule, which has now
become a rule of property, it should be done by an act of the legislature and not
by judicial decision."
8 Will of Ward, 70 Wis. 251, 35 N. W. 731, 5 Am. St. Rep. 174 (1887). During
her second marriage a woman made a will giving her property to the children
of her first marriage. She afterwards married again, and died leaving her third
husband surviving. She had no issue by either the second or third marriages.
Held, under the statutes giving to married women the absolute right to dispose
of their property, the will was not revoked by the third marriage. Will of Lyon,
96 Wis. 339, 71 N. W. 362, 363, 65 Am. St. Rep. 52 (1897). A woman made
her will, later married and died without issue. Headnote: "The marriage of a
woman does not revoke a will previously made by her, the common-law rule in
that regard having been changed by the statutory removal of her disabilities
in respect to the disposition of her property." Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis. 605 at
607, 87 N. W. 853, 56 L. R. A. 258 (1901). A man'made his will, later married.
He and his wife thereafter adopted a child. "The earlier cases seemed to go
upon the theory that such a marriage and birth raised a mere presumption of an
intent to revoke, but the rule held in the earlier cases was finally confirmed in
the Privy Council in Israell v. Roden, 2 Moore, P. C. 51, where it was expressly
held that 'marriage and birth of a child do not afford presumptive evidence of
intention to revoke, but are in themselves an absolute revocation of a will made
previous to the marriage but not in contemplation of it." Gailey v. Brown, 169
Wis. 444 at 448, 171 N. W. 945, 946 (1919). Testator domiciled in Illinois made
a will, married and died without issue, leaving real estate in Wisconsin. "This
interpretation of our statutes excludes the idea that marriage alone, as the
Illinois statutes provide, shall be deemed a revocation of a -priorwill."

